Crime as risk taking by Dhami, MK & Mandel, DR
1 
 
Dhami, M. K., & Mandel, D. R. (2012). Crime as risk taking. Psychology, Crime 
and Law, 18, 389-403. 
 
Crime as Risk Taking 
 
Mandeep K. Dhami  
 
Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, UK 
 
 
David R. Mandel  
 
Thinking, Risk, and Intelligence Group, Defence Research and Development, Toronto, 
Canada 
 
Corresponding Author: 
Mandeep K. Dhami 
Institute of Criminology 
University of Cambridge  
Sidgwick Avenue 
Cambridge, CB3 9DA 
UK 
 
David R. Mandel 
Thinking, Risk, and Intelligence Group 
Adversarial Intent Section 
DRDC Toronto 
1133 Sheppard Ave West, P.O. Box 2000 
Toronto, ON M3M 3B9  
Canada 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
Engagement in criminal activity may be viewed as risk taking behaviour as it has both benefits and 
drawbacks that are probabilistic. In two studies, we examined how individuals’ risk perceptions can 
inform our understanding of their intentions to engage in criminal activity. Study 1 measured youths’ 
perceptions of the value and probability of the benefits and drawbacks of engaging in three common 
crimes (i.e., shoplifting, forgery, and buying illegal drugs), and examined how well these perceptions 
predicted youths’ forecasted engagement in these crimes, controlling for their past engagement. We 
found that intentions to engage in criminal activity were best predicted by the perceived value of the 
benefits that may be obtained, irrespective of their probabilities or the drawbacks that may also be 
incurred. Study 2 specified the benefit and drawback that youth thought about and examined another 
crime (i.e., drinking and driving). The findings of Study 1 were replicated under these conditions. The 
present research supports a limited rationality perspective on criminal intentions, and can have 
implications for crime prevention/intervention strategies. 
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Introduction 
When considered in the context of crime, the notion of risk is typically discussed in 
terms of the risk of crime and/or victimization (e.g., Reisig, Pratt, & Holtfreter, 2009) 
or in terms of the factors placing an individual at risk of becoming involved in crime 
(e.g., Bowey & McGlaughlin, 2006). In this paper, we consider crime as a form of 
risky behaviour that people may decide to engage in after perceiving the outcomes 
associated with the illegal behaviour. Indeed, akin to Knight’s (1921) definition of 
risk that highlights the potential benefits and drawbacks of engaging in a behaviour 
along with their associated probabilities of occurrence, crime may involve positive or 
negative outcomes that are less than certain. For instance, shoplifting may provide the 
offender with a much desired product or an indirect means of obtaining such a product 
after selling the stolen item. On the other hand, shoplifting may also result in a 
criminal conviction and a prison sentence. An individual may perceive the chances of 
obtaining a desired product as being somewhat greater than the chances of being 
convicted and imprisoned. 
Rational choice theories of risk taking such as subjective expected utility 
theory portray people as rational decision makers who attach values to the possible 
rewards and the costs associated with an action, calculate the probabilities of these 
rewards and costs, weigh the values of rewards and costs by their respective 
probabilities, and choose the course of action that maximizes rewards and minimizes 
costs (see Anand, 1995; Fishburn, 1981; Gruber, 2001). Thus, such theories suggest 
that individuals use compensatory decision strategies that weight and integrate all of 
the available and relevant information in order to make a decision as to whether or not 
to engage in a risky behaviour. A rational choice perspective has been used by some 
to explain engagement in criminal activity (see Becker, 1968; Clarke & Felson, 1993; 
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Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Seipel & Eifler, 2008; Newman, Clarke, & Shoham, 1997; 
Piquero & Tibbetts, 2002). For instance, in an early study, Carroll and Weaver (1986) 
found that when intending to shoplift, offenders reported considering specific tactics, 
risks and deterrents, as well as rewards or motivations such as attraction to an item 
and use or need for it. Nagin and Paternoster (1993) also demonstrated that perceived 
costs and benefits were predictive of crime. 
However, it is argued that people’s rationality is bounded by external 
constraints such as limited time, information and resources as well as internal 
constraints such as limited cognitive processing ability and emotions (see Gigerenzer, 
Todd, & the ABC Group, 1999; Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 1956, 1982; Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & McGregor, 2002). This suggests that people often use non-
compensatory strategies that ignore much of the available and relevant information 
when making a decision. Indeed, a limited rationality perspective has also been 
applied to understanding criminal engagement (see Johnson & Payne, 1986; Trassler, 
1993; Tunnell, 2002). For instance, in an early study, Feeney (1986) found that most 
robbers said their decisions to rob were motivated by a desire for money (e.g., for 
drugs) or for other reasons such as out of anger or for excitement. Over half said their 
decisions to rob were impulsive and did not involve planning, and nearly two-thirds 
said they had not thought at all of the negative consequences of committing the crime 
such as getting caught. More recently, studies have shown that burglars use “fast and 
frugal” heuristic strategies, that rely on one cue alone, in their decision about whether 
a residential property is occupied or not (Snook, Dhami, & Kavanagh, 2009) and in 
their choice of which property to burgle (Garcia-Retamero & Dhami, 2009). 
Research on risk taking behaviour in general has typically found evidence 
consistent with a limited (rather than full) rationality perspective. In particular, studies 
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of youth have found that risk taking is predicted by or associated with their focus on 
the perceived benefits of engaging in risky behaviours, and there is little evidence to 
suggest that they weight and integrate the costs and benefits. For example, Siegel and 
his colleagues found that engagement in behaviours including alcohol use, illegal drug 
use, sexual activity, stereotypical male behaviours, imprudent behaviours, and 
socially unacceptable behaviours by college students as well as adolescents diagnosed 
with conduct disorder, was better predicted by their perceived benefits of engaging in 
these behaviours than the perceived costs (Lavery, Siegel, Cousins, & Rubovitts, 
1993; Parsons, Halkitis, Bimbi, & Borkowski, 2000; Parsons, Siegel, & Cousins, 
1997; Shapiro, Siegel, Scovill, & Hays, 1998; Siegel, Cousins, Rubovitts, Parsons, 
Lavery, & Crowley, 1994). Bauman and his colleagues measured youths’ perceptions 
of the desirability and probability of the consequences of risky behaviours (e.g., 
alcohol, tobacco and drug use, and risky sexual behaviour) and found inconsistent 
evidence for the idea that youths maximize subjective expected utility in past or 
forecasted risk taking (Bauman & Bryan, 1983; Bauman, Fisher, & Bryan, 2006; 
Bauman, Fisher, Bryan, & Chenoweth, 1984; 1985; Bauman, Fisher, & Koch, 1989; 
Bauman & Udry, 1981; Gilbert, Bauman, & Udry, 1986).  
The studies by Siegel and his colleagues, however, did not separately measure 
the subjective probabilities of the costs and benefits, and so it is unclear if young 
people were driven by their desire to obtain the benefits or their belief that the 
benefits are probable, or both. By contrast, the studies by Bauman and his colleagues 
did not examine the independent effects of the value attached to the costs and benefits 
and the subjective probabilities of the costs and benefits.  
Given that Knight (1921) pointed out that the concept of risk should be 
defined as any expected outcome – positive or negative – whose probability of 
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occurrence is less than certain, in the present research, we fully unpack youths’ risk 
perceptions of criminal activities in terms of their perceived: (a) importance of the 
potential benefits, (b) importance of the potential drawbacks, (c) probability of 
obtaining the benefits, and (d) probability of incurring the drawbacks. Our main goal 
was to determine which components of youths’ risk perceptions are valid predictors of 
their forecasted engagement in criminal activity, controlling for their past 
engagement.  
Competing views on the impact of risk perceptions on criminal engagement 
Several competing views about the factors that predict forecasted engagement 
in criminal activity may be examined. First, we investigate competing views about the 
predictive value of the perceived benefits versus the perceived drawbacks of engaging 
in criminal activity. In accordance with descriptive theories of risky choice, such as 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), that predict loss aversion or greater 
sensitivity to losses than to gains of equal magnitude, one might consider that 
forecasted engagement in criminal activity would be better predicted by youths’ 
assessments of expected loss rather than expected gain. Conversely, and consistent 
with some past literature on youth risk taking and on crime reviewed above (e.g., 
Feeney, 1986; Lavery et al., 1993; Parsons et al., 2000; Parsons et al., 1997; Shapiro 
et al., 1998; Siegel et al., 1994), many risky behaviours appear to be taken because of 
their potential desirable consequences in spite of the possible losses they also entail. 
Based on those findings, one might alternatively consider that youths’ forecasted 
criminal activity is based on their expected benefits.  
Second, we examine views about the predictive value of perceived importance 
of outcomes versus their subjective probabilities in order to clearly understand the 
basis for any observed gain-loss asymmetry in the prediction of forecasted criminal 
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activity. For example, if perceived benefits are found to predict forecasts better than 
perceived drawbacks, that may be due to the fact that benefits are perceived as more 
likely than drawbacks, that benefits are perceived as being greater in magnitude than 
drawbacks, or both. We suggest that youths’ perceptions of outcome importance 
would be more influential in their forecasted criminal activity than their subjective 
probabilities of the outcomes because the former would be easier to mentally 
construct. Outcomes, such as being caught by the police or being sent to prison can be 
vividly imagined. By contrast, the probabilities of such events are second-order 
judgments (i.e., judgments of the likelihood of what has been judged to be a possible 
outcome of a given act) that are less amenable to visualization. Stated differently, one 
can represent a possible outcome (e.g., being sent to prison) without thinking about its 
probability, but one cannot think about the probability of the outcome without 
thinking about the outcome itself.  
Finally, we investigate competing views about the complexity of the model 
predicting forecasted engagement in criminal activity. According to the rational 
choice perspective, forecasted criminal activity should be the product of an interaction 
of the importance (or value) of perceived outcomes and their subjective probabilities. 
By contrast, according to the limited rationality perspective and consistent with some 
past research on youth risk taking and on crime (e.g., Bauman et al., 2006; Bauman et 
al., 1989; Feeney, 1986; Lavery et al., 1993; Parsons et al., 2000; Parsons et al., 1997; 
Shapiro et al., 1998; Siegel et al., 1994), youths’ forecasted engagement in criminal 
activity would be better predicted simply by a measure of the perceived importance of 
potential benefits than from a measure that interactively combined the perceived 
importance of the potential benefits with the subjective probability of the benefits.  
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To date, no study has provided a clear test of the independent predictive 
validities of these components or how they might interact in predicting forecasted 
engagement in criminal activity. Is youths’ forecasted engagement in criminal activity 
preceded by a thought process that weights and integrates all of the available and 
relevant information? Or, is youths’ forecasted criminal engagement the consequence 
of a thought process that uses only a limited amount of the available and relevant 
information? Furthermore, while much of the extant research on engagement in 
criminal activity has examined past crimes (e.g., Ostrowsky & Messner, 2005) or 
experts’ forecasts of potential offending (e.g., Hanson, 2009), we focused on 
individuals’ intentions to engage in criminal activity, controlling for their past 
engagement. This enables investigation of the cognitive determinants of the intent to 
commit crimes. Beyond the practical implications for informing intervention 
strategies, our findings can inform theories of crime by demonstrating the importance 
of specific risk perception measures in predicting intentions to engage in criminal 
activity.  
We conducted two studies that tested the above competing views on the 
impact of risk perceptions on forecasted engagement in criminal activity. In Study 1, 
youth were asked to think about the potential benefits and drawbacks of three 
different criminal activities (i.e., buying an illegal drug, shoplifting a small item, and 
forging a signature), to judge the perceived importance and probabilities of these 
outcomes, and to forecast their engagement in these behaviours. In Study 2, we aimed 
to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1 by studying drinking and driving and 
presenting youth with a potential benefit and drawback of this behaviour, thus 
controlling for the specific outcomes that youth thought about and responded to. 
Study 1 
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Aims 
The main aim of Study 1 was to examine how well the following variables 
predict forecasted criminal engagement, controlling for past engagement: 1) perceived 
importance of the potential benefits, 2) perceived importance of the potential 
drawbacks, 3) subjective probability of the benefits, and 4) subjective probability of 
the drawbacks, 5) perceived importance of the benefits  subjective probability of the 
benefits, and 6) perceived importance of the drawbacks  subjective probability of the 
drawbacks. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety undergraduates volunteered to participate in the study in return for bonus 
credits in an introductory psychology course. Forty-three percent (n = 39) were male. 
The mean age of the sample was 19.42 years (SD = 1.85).  
Survey 
Participants completed a survey comprising three sections. Two sections asked about 
risk perceptions and one about forecasted engagement in criminal activity for three 
illegal behaviours. The three behaviours were buying an illegal drug, shoplifting a 
small item, and forging a signature. These have been shown to be criminal activities 
that university students may engage in (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002).  
In one section of the survey, participants were asked to think about the 
potential benefits of engaging in the behaviours. For each behaviour, they were asked 
to rate the importance of the benefits that they might obtain on an 11-point scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all important) to 100 (extremely important). Following each 
rating, participants were asked to indicate their chances, on average across the times 
they would engage in this behaviour, of obtaining these benefits on an 11-point scale 
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from 0% (no chance at all) to 100% (absolutely certain). Another section of the 
survey paralleled this one, except that participants were asked to think about the 
potential drawbacks of engaging in the same behaviours, and to rate the importance of 
the drawbacks, followed by the average chances of incurring the drawbacks. Thus, 
perceived probabilities of the benefits and drawbacks were obtained on average across 
the times that youth might engage in the behaviour, to avoid any problems associated 
with youth giving extremely high or extremely low probability responses based on 
one experience alone. 
The third section of the survey asked about past and forecasted engagement in 
the behaviours. Participants were asked to first forecast the chances that they would 
engage in each of the behaviours in the following 12 months. Ratings were made on 
an 11-point scale from 0% (no chance at all) to 100% (absolutely certain). 
Participants were then asked to report if they had ever (yes/no) engaged in each of the 
behaviours in the past 12 months, and if so how many times. Such self-report 
techniques are often recommended and used to measure crime rates (e.g., Junger-Tas 
& Marshall, 1999). 
Procedure 
The order of the survey’s first two sections was fully counterbalanced across 
participants. The introduction to each section described the task and provided 
instructions to complete it via an example of how a hypothetical participant completed 
an item in it. Participants’ age and gender were also elicited at the beginning. The 
survey was self-administered in small groups, and took approximately 25 minutes to 
complete.  
Findings 
Past and forecasted criminal engagement 
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In the past 12 months, 58.43% of the sample reported buying an illegal drug, 46.67% 
said they had shoplifted a small item, and 62.22% said they had forged a signature. 
Across participants, the mean frequency of past engagement was 3.06 (SD = 7.16) for 
buying an illegal drug, 0.48 (SD = 1.09) for shoplifting, and 0.96 (SD = 2.09) for 
forgery. The mean forecasted chances of buying an illegal drug in the next 12 months 
was 27.78% (SD = 35.09), mean forecasted chances of shoplifting was 9.33% (SD = 
18.83), and mean forecasted chances of forgery was 22.78% (SD = 28.13). There were 
significant positive correlations between past and forecasted criminal engagement: r = 
.61 for buying an illegal drug, r = .55 for shoplifting, and r = .66 for forgery, ps < 
.001.  
Predicting forecasted criminal engagement 
We conducted separate three-step hierarchical multiple linear regression analyses for 
each behaviour in order to determine the relative validity of perceived importance of 
outcomes (benefits and drawbacks), the subjective probabilities of these outcomes, 
and the interaction of outcomes by probabilities, in predicting forecasted criminal 
engagement, controlling for past engagement. In each model, frequency of past 
criminal engagement was entered in step 1. In step 2, the predictor variables (i.e., 
perceived importance of the benefits, perceived importance of the drawbacks, 
subjective probability of the benefits, and subjective probability of the drawbacks) 
were entered. In step 3, the interaction terms (i.e., importance of benefits  probability 
of benefits, and importance of drawbacks  probability of drawbacks) were entered. 
 All of the full models were statistically significant and according to the 
adjusted R
2
 explained 65% of the variance in forecasted buying an illegal drug, 64% 
of the variance in forecasted shoplifting, and 60% of the variance in forecasted 
forgery. Tables 1 to 3 show that the main findings were replicated across the three 
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behaviours. Here, beyond past engagement, forecasted criminal engagement was best 
predicted by the perceived importance of the benefits. Although the subjective 
probability of the benefits was also a significant predictor of forecasted forgery, the 
magnitude of the effect was somewhat smaller.  
TABLES 1 TO 3 ABOUT HERE 
Discussion 
Study 1 therefore supports the notion that intentions to engage in criminal activities 
are best predicted by individuals’ perceptions of the importance or value of the 
benefits that may be gained, irrespective of their probabilities or the drawbacks that 
may also be incurred. This is consistent with past literature on youth risk taking that 
highlights the significance of the benefits to youth and offenders’ use of simple 
decision strategies (e.g., Feeney, 1986; Garcia-Retamero & Dhami, 2009; Lavery et 
al., 1993; Parsons et al., 2000; Parsons et al., 1997; Shapiro et al., 1998; Siegel et al., 
1994; Snook et al., 2009). It is also consistent with the idea that outcomes are easily to 
mentally construct and apply to decisions to engage in future behaviours.  
 However, in Study 1 we did not control for the actual benefits and drawbacks 
that youth thought about and responded to. One strength of this approach is that it 
examines the perceived risk of engaging in criminal activity from the perspective of 
youth rather than the adult-researcher (see also Beyth-Marom, Austin, Fischhoff, 
Palmgren, & Jacobs-Quadrel, 1993; Dhami & Garcia-Retamero, 2010; Dhami, 
Mandel, & Garcia-Retamero, 2010). On the other hand, it is important to study the 
robustness of the effect under more controlled conditions. 
Study 2 
Aim 
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The main aim of Study 2 therefore was to replicate the findings of Study 1 controlling 
for the outcomes that youth thought about and responded to. In addition, Study 2 
aimed to test the generalisability of the findings of Study 1 by focusing on a different 
criminal activity, namely drinking and driving.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 105 undergraduates who volunteered to participate in the study in 
return for bonus credits in an introductory psychology course. Thirty-six percent (n = 
38) were male. The mean age of the sample was 20.81 years (SD = 3.75).  
Survey 
Participants completed a survey comprising three sections. Two sections asked about 
risk perceptions and one asked about forecasted drinking and driving (after 
consuming five or more alcoholic drinks which would be over the legal alcohol limit 
for driving). Here, risk perceptions were elicited for a specific possible benefit and 
drawback of drinking and driving (i.e., it is cheaper than alternative ways of returning 
home, and it may lead to a negative formal/legal sanction, respectively). These 
outcomes were taken from a previous study which used a qualitative method to elicit 
youths’ perceptions of the possible positive and negative outcomes associated with 
drinking and driving (Dhami et al., 2010).  
As in Study 1, in one section of the survey participants were asked to imagine 
drinking and driving. They then read about a possible benefit of drinking and driving, 
and rated the importance of the benefit on an 11-point scale from 0 (not at all 
important) to 100 (extremely important). Following that, participants rated the 
chances of obtaining the benefit on an 11-point scale from 0% (no chance at all) to 
100% (absolutely certain). A second section of the survey similarly presented 
14 
 
participants with a possible drawback of drinking and driving that they rated in terms 
of importance, and chances of occurring. Finally, the third section of the survey asked 
about past and forecasted drinking and driving. Participants rated the chance that they 
would drink and drive in the following 12 months on an 11-point scale from 0% (no 
chance at all) to 100% (absolutely certain). Participants then reported if they had ever 
(yes/no) engaged in drinking and driving in the past 12 months, and if so, how many 
times. 
Procedure 
The order of the survey’s first two sections was counterbalanced across participants. 
The introduction to each section described the task and provided instructions to 
complete it via an example of how a hypothetical participant completed an item in it. 
Participants’ age and gender were also elicited at the beginning. The survey was self-
administered in small groups, and took approximately 25 minutes to complete.  
Findings 
Past and forecasted drinking and driving 
Twenty-three percent of the sample reported drinking and driving in the past 12 
months (after consuming five or more alcoholic drinks). Across participants, the mean 
frequency of drinking and driving was 0.25 (SD = 0.79). The mean forecasted chances 
of drinking and driving in the next 12 months was 4.86% (SD = 11.94). There was a 
significant positive correlation of r = .50 between past and forecasted drinking and 
driving, p < .001.  
Predicting forecasted drinking and driving 
As in Study 1, we conducted a three-step hierarchical multiple linear regression 
analysis to predict forecasted drinking and driving. Past frequency of drinking and 
driving was entered in step 1. In step 2, the predictor variables (i.e., perceived 
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importance of the benefits, perceived importance of the drawbacks, subjective 
probability of the benefits, and subjective probability of the drawbacks) were entered. 
In step 3, the interaction terms (i.e., importance of benefits  probability of benefits, 
and importance of drawbacks  probability of drawbacks) were entered. 
 The full model was statistically significant and according to the adjusted R
2
 
explained 25% of the variance in forecasted drinking and driving. Table 4 shows that 
beyond past drinking and driving, only perceived importance of the benefits was a 
significant predictor of forecasted drinking and driving.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Discussion 
Study 2 therefore replicated the findings of Study 1, when controlling for the 
outcomes that youth thought about and to which they responded. Study 2 also 
demonstrated that the findings of Study 1 could be generalized to another criminal 
activity (i.e., drinking and driving) that is common among university populations 
(Paschal, 2003; Steptoe et al., 2004). Intentions to drink and drive are best predicted 
by individuals’ perceptions of the importance or value of the benefits that may be 
gained, irrespective of their probabilities or the drawbacks that may also be incurred.  
General discussion 
The present research described youths’ past and forecasted engagement in a range of 
illegal behaviours, and it predicted their forecasted engagement in these behaviours, 
controlling for their past engagement. The findings contribute to the extant literature 
on (limited) rational choice theories of both risk taking and crime in three key ways. 
First, we show that the prediction of forecasted engagement in criminal activity relied 
on a model that, given past engagement, was sensitive only to the perceived 
importance of the benefits associated with engaging in the relevant behaviour. Indeed, 
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the descriptive model supported by the current findings is simple in two respects. 
First, no interaction terms were reliable, contrary to the subjective expected utility 
model, which relies exclusively on such terms. Second, only one predictor variable 
was reliable for all but one of the behaviours studied. Thus, the model is simple in the 
sense that the number of considered factors appear to be minimal. These findings 
accord with previous literature indicating that people rely on simple heuristics to 
arrive at decisions (see Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; 
Slovic et al., 2002). The present findings are also consistent with past research 
demonstrating that offenders use limited rationality (e.g., Feeney, 1986; Garcia-
Retamero & Dhami, 2009; Johnson & Payne, 1986; Snook et al., 2009; Trassler, 
1993; Tunnell, 2002). In an earlier study, Moore and Gullone (1996) also found that 
youth engagement in the general categories of major and minor crimes and dangerous 
driving was predicted by a limited number of risk perceptions. They, however, did not 
test interaction effects or specify the precise behaviours and outcomes, as we did. 
Second, the present research found that contrary to the aphorism that ‘losses 
loom larger than gains (of equal magnitude)’ (notably captured in Kahneman and 
Tversky’s, 1979, prospect theory), gains in fact appear to loom larger than losses in 
youths’ forecasted engagement in criminal activity. The present findings are 
consistent with the small body of recent research showing that youths’ intentions to 
take risks are better explained by their perceptions of the expected benefits than the 
costs (e.g., Halpern-Felsher, Biehl, Kropp, & Rubinstein, 2004; Parsons et al., 1997; 
Weber et al., 2002). However, as with the studies on past risk taking reviewed earlier, 
these studies on future risk taking often confounded outcomes and probabilities. The 
present research clearly separated the benefits and drawbacks, and the outcomes from 
their probabilities. 
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Finally, the present research showed that the focus on gains was largely 
restricted to outcomes alone, while probabilities were not predictive of forecasted 
engagement in criminal activity. Youth may focus on the importance rather than the 
probability of benefits because it is easier to think about how much benefit doing Y 
would bring than to think about how probable that level of benefit would be if Y were 
enacted. Moreover, it may be that the benefits are immediate and thus experienced or 
easier to imagine being experienced, whereas the drawbacks are long-term and may 
therefore have not been experienced or may be difficult to imagine. However, youth 
in Study 1 were not asked to identify the benefits and drawbacks that they thought 
about, and in Study 2, both the benefit and drawback presented to youth were those 
that would occur during driving and so were potentially relatively equal in their time 
perspective. Recent studies of youths’ perceptions of risky driving behaviours, 
including drinking and driving, have found mixed evidence for the idea that the 
perceived benefits are short-term (Dhami & Garcia-Retamero, 2010; Dhami et al., 
2010). Nevertheless, research could be designed to determine if the short-term nature 
of perceived potential benefits of illegal behaviours renders them more predictive of 
forecasted criminal engagement than the long-term nature of perceived potential 
drawbacks. 
Limitations and directions for future research 
One could argue that our sample of university students limits the generalisability of 
the findings. While this population is not typical of offending groups and is unlikely 
to be processed through the criminal justice system, a sizeable proportion of the 
participants in the present research had engaged in the illegal behaviours studied in 
the past 12 months. These behaviours are common and carry prison sentences. 
Nevertheless, future research ought to be directed at useful replications with first-time 
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versus repeat offenders, generalist versus specialist offenders, and opportunistic 
versus professional offenders. However, there are ethical issues involved in studying 
offenders ‘at work’, and there is also a limitation to studying incarcerated offenders. 
The present study attempted to overcome the shortcomings of some past 
research by separately measuring the different components of risk (i.e., perceived 
importance of the benefits and drawbacks, and subjective probabilities of the benefits 
and drawbacks) and examining their independent and interactive value in predicting 
forecasted engagement in criminal activity, controlling for past engagement. In the 
present cross-sectional design, there was a predictable significant positive association 
between past and forecasted criminal engagement. Nevertheless, future research could 
adopt a longitudinal design to examine how well youths’ forecasts predict actual 
future criminal engagement. However, this may be ethically unsound (e.g., asking 
youth to think about the potential benefits of crime may promote criminal 
involvement), and practically difficult given the time and resources required.  
Although a sizeable proportion of the variance in forecasted engagement in 
criminal activity could be accounted for by the perceived importance of the benefits, 
there is also variance that remains to be accounted for. Future research could aim to 
identify other factors that predict forecasted criminal engagement either directly, or 
indirectly through influencing risk perceptions. For instance, more recently, some 
researchers have recognized the role of non-cognitive factors such as emotions in 
explaining risk taking. Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001) argue that both 
anticipated and anticipatory positive and negative emotions such as regret and 
excitement may influence risk taking both directly and indirectly through impacting 
risk perceptions.  
Implications for intervention  
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Beyond the implications for theories of ‘crime as risk taking,’ our findings have 
implications for intervention strategies. Typically, youth are considered to engage in 
risky behaviours, including illegal ones, because they either are unaware of the costs 
or the probabilities of incurring these costs. Thus, intervention and prevention have 
often focused on educating and informing youth of these (e.g., by advertising the 
penalty associated with drinking and driving) or increasing the costs and their 
probabilities (e.g., by increasing the penalties and the surveillance). However, the 
present findings cast some doubt on the effectiveness of such approaches. As we have 
found, although youth may be aware of the costs and even consider them to be 
important and probable, it is the value that they attach to the benefits (independent of 
their probabilities) that motivates their intentions to engage in criminal activity.  
Therefore, strategies ought to identify and change youths’ perceptions of the 
potential benefits of engaging in criminal behaviours. Strategies should also be 
designed to provide youth with alternative (legal) behaviours which hold the desired 
benefits. For instance, many university campuses have established ‘safe ride services’ 
to reduce the likelihood that youth drink and drive or ride with a drunk driver 
(Caudill, Harding, & Moore, 2000). In addition, as others have suggested, youth could 
be taught to weight the positive and negative outcomes by their probabilities and 
integrate them so they can make better-informed choices (Baron & Brown, 1991; 
Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1997). Ultimately, such strategies may serve to reduce the 
losses suffered by young people who engage in criminal behaviours as well as limit 
the demands placed on the criminal justice system as a result of youth offending.  
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Table 1. Model predicting forecasted buying an illegal drug 
 
Step Variables Model 1 β Model 2 β Model 3 β 
1. Past engagement     .61
***
     .34
***
     .35
***
 
2. Importance benefits      .56
***
     .67
***
 
    Probabilities benefits      .05     .08 
    Importance drawbacks      .19
*
     .17 
    Probabilities drawbacks     -.15    -.17 
3. Import. ben.  prob. ben.      -.14 
    Import. draw.  prob. draw.       .04 
Adjusted R
2
     .36     .66     .65 
∆R2     .37     .31     .00 
F (df) 50.40
***
 
(1,88) 
34.87
***
 
(5,88) 
24.54
***
 
(7,88) 
∆F (df)  19.98*** 
(4,83) 
    .27 
(2,81) 
*
p < .05, 
**
p < .01, 
***
p < .001.  
 
22 
 
Table 2. Model predicting forecasted shoplifting a small item 
 
Step Variables Model 1 β Model 2 β Model 3 β 
1. Past engagement     .55
***
     .48
***
     .49
***
 
2. Importance benefits      .37
***
     .32
*
 
    Probabilities benefits      .10     .06 
    Importance drawbacks     -.22
*
    -.11 
    Probabilities drawbacks      .05     .32 
3. Import. ben.  prob. ben.        .05 
    Import. draw.  prob. draw.      -.36 
Adjusted R
2
     .30     .47     .47 
∆R2     .30     .20     .01 
F (df) 38.22
***
 
(1,89) 
17.03
***
 
(5,89) 
12.24
***
 
(7,89) 
∆F (df)    8.48*** 
(4,84) 
  0.64 
(2,82) 
*
p < .05, 
**
p < .01, 
***
p < .001.  
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Table 3. Model predicting forecasted forging a signature 
 
Step Variables Model 1 β Model 2 β Model 3 β 
1. Past engagement     .66
***
     .45
***
     .45
***
 
2. Importance benefits      .27
**
     .30
*
 
    Probabilities benefits      .21
*
     .25
*
 
    Importance drawbacks     -.11    -.08 
    Probabilities drawbacks     -.03     .05 
3. Import. ben.  prob. ben.      -.07 
    Import. draw.  prob. draw.      -.11 
Adjusted R
2
     .44     .61     .60 
∆R2     .44     .19     .00 
F (df) 69.57
***
 
(1,89) 
28.43
***
 
(5,89) 
19.98
***
 
(7,89) 
∆F (df)  10.58*** 
(4,84) 
  0.20 
(2,82) 
*
p < .05, 
**
p < .01, 
***
p < .001. 
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Table 4. Model predicting forecasted drinking and driving 
 
Step Variables Model 1 β Model 2 β Model 3 β 
1. Past engagement     .50
*
   .46
***
   .43
***
 
2. Importance benefits    .16   .44
*
 
    Probabilities benefits   -.08   .01 
    Importance drawbacks   -.07   .05 
    Probabilities drawbacks    .04   .37 
3. Import. ben.  prob. ben.    -.34 
    Import. draw.  prob. draw.    -.41 
Adjusted R
2
     .24   .24   .25 
∆R2     .25   .03   .02 
F (df) 34.48
***
 
(1,104) 
7.61
***
 
(5,104) 
5.90
***
 
(7,104) 
∆F (df)  0.92 
(4,99) 
1.44 
(2,97) 
*
p < .05, 
**
p < .01, 
***
p < .001. 
 
 
  
25 
 
Mandeep K. Dhami , PhD, is a Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Criminology, University of 
Cambridge. Mandeep has a background in psychology and criminology, and her research interests are 
in judgment and decision making, and criminal justice. She is Fellow of the Society for the 
Psychological Study of Social Issues, Division 9 of the APA. Mandeep has advised criminal justice 
agencies, and trained judges, magistrates, and police officers. She also has work experience as a 
psychologist in English prisons and as an outreach worker in restorative justice programs in Canada. 
 
David R. Mandel, PhD, is a senior defence scientist, who heads the Thinking, Risk, and Intelligence 
Group (TRIG) in the Adversarial Intent Section at Defence R&D Canada—Toronto. He is also Adjunct 
Professor of Psychology at the University of Toronto. His research examines human thinking and 
judgment. David is a Fellow of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. He has 
provided scientific advice to several organizations including NATO, the National Institutes of Health, 
the National Academies, and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.  
  
26 
 
Anand, P. (1995). Foundations of rational choice under risk. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Baron, J., & Brown, R.V. (Eds.) (1991). Teaching decision making to adolescents. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Bauman, K.E., & Bryan, E.S. (1983). Adolescent beer drinking: Subjective expected 
utility and gender differences. Youth & Society, 15, 157-170. 
Bauman, K.E., Fisher, L.A., & Bryan, S.E. (2006). External variables, subjective 
expected utility, and adolescent behavior with alcohol and cigarettes. Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology, 19, 789-804 
Bauman, K.E., Fisher, L.A., Bryan, S.E., & Chenoweth, R.L. (1984). Antecedents, 
subjective expected utility, and behavior: A panel study of adolescent cigarette 
smoking. Addictive Behaviors, 9, 121-136. 
Bauman, K.E., Fisher, L.A., Bryan, S.E., & Chenoweth, R.L. (1985). Relationship 
between subjective expected utility, and behavior: A longitudinal study of 
adolescent drinking behavior. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 46, 32-38.  
Bauman, K.E., Fisher, L., & Koch, G. (1989). External variables, subjective expected 
utility and adolescent behavior with alcohol and cigarettes. Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology, 19, 789-804. 
Bauman, K.E., & Udry, J.R. (1981). Subjective expected utility and adolescent sexual 
behavior. Adolescence, 16, 527-535. 
Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of 
Political Economy, 76, 169-217. 
Beyth-Marom, R., Austin, L., Fischhoff, B., Palmgren, C., & Jacobs-Quadrel, M. 
(1993). Perceived consequences of risky behaviors. Developmental 
Psychology, 29, 549-563. 
27 
 
Beyth-Marom, R., & Fischhoff, B. (1997). Adolescents' decisions about risks: A 
cognitive perspective. In J. Schulenberg, J. Maggs, & K. Hurnelmans (Eds.), 
Health risks and developmental transaction during adolescence (pp. 110-135). 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bowey, L. & McGlaughlin, A. (2006). The youth crime reduction video project: An 
evaluation of a pilot intervention targeting young people at risk of crime and 
school exclusion. The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 45, 268-283. 
Carroll, J., & Weaver, F. (1986). Shoplifters’ perceptions of crime opportunities: A 
process-tracing study. In B. Cornish & R.V.G. Clarke (Eds.), The reasoning 
criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending (pp. 19-38). New York: 
Springer - Verlag. 
Caudill, B.D., Harding, W.M., & Moore, B.A. (2000). At-risk drinkers use safe ride 
services to avoid drinking and driving. Journal of Substance Abuse, 11, 149-
159. 
Clarke, R.V.G., & Felson, M. (1993). Routine activity and rational choice. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Cornish, D.B., & Clarke, R.V. (1986). The reasoning criminal: Rational choice 
perspectives on offending. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Dhami, M.K. & Garcia-Retamero, R. (2010). Spanish youth’s perceptions of the costs 
and benefits of risky driving.  Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Dhami, M.K., Mandel, D.R., & Garcia-Retamero, R. (2010). Canadian and Spanish 
youths’ perceptions of mixing alcohol and driving. Manuscript submitted for 
publication. 
28 
 
Feeney, F. (1986). Robbers as decision makers. In D.B. Cornish & R.V.G. Clarke 
(Eds.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending (pp. 
53-71). New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Fishburn, P.C. (1981). Subjective expected utility: A review of normative theories. 
Theory and Decision, 13, 139-199. 
Garcia-Retamero, R., & Dhami, M.K. (2009). Take-the-best in expert-novice decision 
strategies for residential burglary. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 163-
169. 
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P.M., & the ABC Research Group (1999). Simple heuristics 
that make us smart. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gilbert, M.A., Bauman, K.E., & Udry, J.R. (1986). A panel study of subjective 
expected utility for adolescent sexual behavior. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 16, 745-756. 
Gruber, J. (2001) (Ed.), Risky behavior among youths. An economic analysis. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Halpern-Felsher, B.L., Biehl, M., Kropp, R.Y., & Rubinstein, M.L. (2004). Perceived 
risks and benefits of smoking: Differences among adolescents with different 
smoking experiences and intentions. Preventive Medicine, 39, 559-567. 
Hanson, K.R. (2009). The psychological assessment of risk for crime and violence. 
Canadian Psychology, 50, 172-182. 
Johnson, E., & Payne, J. (1986). The decision to commit a crime: An information 
processing analysis. In D.B. Cornish, & R.V. Clarke (Eds.), The reasoning 
criminal (pp. 170-185). New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Junger-Tas, J., & Marshall, I.H. (1999). The self-report method in crime research. 
Crime and Justice, 25, 291-367. 
29 
 
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded 
rationality. American Psychologist, 58, 697-720. 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: 
Heuristics and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under 
risk. Econometrica, 47, 313-327. 
Knight, F.H. (1921/1964). Risk, uncertainty, and profit. New York: Sentry Press. 
Lavery, B., Siegel, A.W., Cousins, J.H., & Rubovitts, D.S. (1993). Adolescent risk-
taking: An analysis of problem behaviors in problem children. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 55, 277-294. 
Loewenstein, G.F., Hsee, C.K., Weber, E.U., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings. 
Psychological Bulletin, 127, 267-286. 
Nagin, D., & Paternoster, R. (1993). Enduring individual differences and rational 
choice theories of crime. Law and Society Review, 27, 467-496. 
Newman, G., Clarke, R.V., & Shohan, S.G.. (1997). Rational choice and situational 
crime prevention. Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing Group. 
Ostrowsky, M.K., & Messner, S.F. (2005). Explaining crime for a young adult 
population: An application of general strain theory. Journal of Criminal 
Justice, 33, 463-476. 
Parsons, J.T., Halkitis, P.N., Bimbi, D., & Borkowski, T. (2000). Perceptions of the 
benefits and costs associated with condom use and unprotected sex among late 
adolescent college students. Journal of Adolescence, 23, 377-391. 
Parsons, J.T., Siegel, A.W., Cousins, J.H. (1997). Late adolescent risk-taking: effects 
of perceived benefits and perceived risks on behavioral intentions and 
behavioral change. Journal of Adolescence, 20, 381-392. 
30 
 
Paschal, M.J. (2003). College attendance and risk-related driving behavior in a 
national sample of young adults. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 64, 43-49. 
Piquero, A.R., & Tibbetts, S.G. (2002). Rational choice and criminal behavior: 
Recent research and future challenges. New York: Routledge. 
Reisig, M.D., Pratt, T.C., & Holtfreter, K. (2009). Perceived risk of internet theft 
victimization. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 36, 369-384. 
Seipel, C., & Eifler, S. (2008). Opportunities, rational choice, and self-control: On the 
interaction of person and situation in a general theory of crime. Crime & 
Delinquency. 
Shapiro R., Siegel, A.W., Scovill, L.C., & Hays J. (1998). Risk-taking patterns of 
female adolescents: what they do and why. Journal of Adolescence, 21, 143-
159. 
Siegel, A.W., Cousins, J.H., Rubovitts, D., Parsons, J.T., Lavery, B., & Crowley, C. 
(1994). Adolescents’ perceptions of the benefits and risks of their own risk-
taking. Journal of Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, 2, 89-98. 
Simon, H.A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. 
Psychological Review, 63, 129-138. 
Simon, H.A. (1982). Models of bounded rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Slovic, P., Finucane, M.L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D.G. (2002). The affect 
heuristic. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and 
biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 397-420). New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Snook, B., Dhami, M.K., & Kavanagh, J.M. (2009). Simply criminal: Predicting 
burglars’ occupancy decisions with a simple heuristic. Manuscript submitted 
for publication. 
31 
 
Steptoe, A., Wardle, J., Bages, N., Sallis, J.F., Sanabria-Farrand, P.A., & Sanchez, M. 
(2004). Drinking and driving in university students: An international study of 
23 countries. Psychology & Health, 19, 527-540. 
Trassler, G. (1993). Conscience, opportunity, rational choice and crime. In R.V.G. 
Clarke & M.S. Felson (Eds.), Routine activity and rational choice (pp. 305-
322). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Tunnell, K.D. (2002). The impulsiveness and routinization of decision-making. In A. 
R. Piquero, & S.G. Tibbetts (Eds.), Rational choice and criminal behaviour: 
Recent research and future challenges (pp. 265-278). New York: Routledge. 
Weber, E.U., Blais, A., & Betz, N.E. (2002). A domain-specific risk-attitude scale: 
Measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 15, 263-290. 
